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Résumé –Cetarticle comparel esmodèlesu nitairee tcollectif sur lab ased ed onnéescollectives
simuléesen présenced ed ivers typesde taxation desr evenus.Nous distinguonsen particulieru n
système d’imposition individuelle etu nsystème d’imposition jointe. Enspécifiantu nm odèle unitaire
flexible,dut ype de ceux utilisésdanslalittératuree mpirique,nous obtenonsdesestimationsassez
différentess elon le régime fiscalutilisép our simulerlesdonnées.Nous trouvonsaussid esdifférences
substantiellesdanslesajustements de l’offred etravail prédits àlasuited ’unchangementde régime
fiscal. Nosr ésultats illustrentégalementle faitquel ecalibrage desparamètresd’une réforme fiscale
peut êtrel ui-même fortementaffectép arl’utilisation d’unm odèle unitairel orsquel esdonnéess ont
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fiscalesen termesde bien-êtred ansu ne telle situation. Lesr ésultats suggèrentqued esefforts accrus
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complexesauxquelleson est confrontél ors de l’analysed eréformesfiscales.Cecii nclut descontraintes
budgétairesdonnantnaissanceàdesensemblesde budgetnon convexes,a insiq uel amodélisation de
solutionsen coin pour lesoffresde travail desconjoints.
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results showt hateven the design of revenue-neutralreformsmaybeh eavilydistorted byt he useo faunitary model
on collectived ata.Finally,wed iscuss distortionsaffecting the welfareanalysisof reformson the basisof unitary
estimatesw hen the model generating the dataisac ollectivem odel. The results suggest thatincreased efforts should
bed evoted tothe estimation of collectivem odelsw ithtaxation.
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OLLECTIVE MODELS of household consumptionand labors upplybehavior,
introduced byChiappori( 1988,1992)and Appsand Rees(1988),a llowt he
representation of individualbehaviorinsidethe household. Bycontrast,the more
widelyu sed unitary modelsconsiderhouseholdbehaviorasr esulting from the
decisionsof asingle individual,occulting the factt hatmost householdsare
composed of severali ndividualsw ho take part in the decision processes.This
precludest he analysisof intra-familyr edistribution of householdresources.Unitary
modelst reatt he familyasab lackbox,sothatt he incomed istribution insidethe
familycannotbereconstructed (see e.g. Lechene,1993). The main difficulty withthe
unitary modelsconcernst he aggregation of preferences(see Arrow,1951 and
Hildenbrand,1994)and of individuald emands(see Deaton and Muellbauer,1980).
Although Samuelson’sconsensusidea(1956)and Becker’saltruisticmodel (1991)
generateconsensualbehaviorasr egardst he resourceallocation withinthe family,the
underlyingassumptionshavebeen criticized ashighlyr estrictive( see e.g. Ben Porath,
1982and Bergstrom,1989);indeed allocationsw ithinthe householdm ayw ell be
conflictual( see Sen,1984).
Foramodel of allocation of leisureand consumption of anaggregateg ood,
Chiappori( 1988,1992)shows thathisdefinition of collectiverationality,which
imposesParetoe fficientallocations,impliesasetof restrictionson the labors upply
functions,a nd thatt hesearesufficientt oi dentifyt he individualp referencesand the
incomesharingrule uptoanadditiveconstant.Theseconditionsconsist in asetof
restrictionson the partiald ifferentialsof the labors upplyfunctions.
The basicmodel hasbeen extended in severald irections,including household
productionand children (Appsand Rees,1996,1997,1999;Chiappori,1997;
Chiuri,1999;Bourguignon,1999),a nd the presenceo fm orethantwod ecision
makers in the household( Browningand Chiappori,1998). Empiricallyr elevant
discreted ecisions,suchasnon-participation of one of the household’smembers,
introducef urtherdifficulties.Even in thatcase,c ompletei dentification (uptoan
additiveconstant)h asbeen shownf orcollectivem odelsw ithalinearbudget
constraint(Blundell etal.,1998)and withac onvexbudgets et(Donni,2003;
Beninger,2003). Mored etailsconcerningthe literatureo ncollectivem odelscanbe
found in the excellents urveyof Vermeulen (2002).
Yetv ast researche ffortsr emain necessary fort he implementationo fcollective
modelsin all situationsw hereunitary modelsareused in practice,in particularin
the presenceo fn on convexbudgetconstraints,a nd formodellingi ntertemporal
allocations.The aim of the presents tudyist oassess the potentialreturnsof sucha
researchp rogram:B ys imulatingd atafrom the collectivem odel wecircumventt he
difficultiest hatarestill connected withi ts estimation,b ut weareable top ointout
the manydistortionscreated byt he useo faunitary model.
Amorep ointed wayt od escribeo ur aim ist osayt hatw esetout toe xhibita
counter-example tothe claim “ Forpracticalp urposes,the choicebetweenthe collectiveand
unitary representationsof household decisionp rocessesdoesnotmattermuch ”. While the
literature–e speciallyin mathematics–aboundsw ithconstrued and mind-boggling
counter-examples,amain message of thispapermaybethatno suchcontortioni s
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needed in the presentcontext.Wevery straightforwardlyelaborated asimple model,
realisticwithin thiss implicity,b ut on the otherhand unrealisticon manyaccounts
(weconsideronlychildless couples,withn osystematicdifferencebetween the
spousesothert hanthe factt hatt heirw age ratesared rawnf rom different
distributions),a nd directlyfound large distortions.Afurtherdevelopmentof this
study,focusing on realisticc alibration fors ixEuropeancountries,taking into
accountt he existing fiscalsystemsand reformsu nderdiscussion,a sw ell ast he
structureo fthe population,a nd investigating howimportantt he distortions
illustrated herem aybef ort hesed ifferentcountries,isdocumented in asetof four
papers –Bargain etal. (2006),V ermeulen etal. (2006),M yck etal. (2006)and
Beninger etal. (2006)– ,thus providing alarge scale sensitivity analysis 1 .Yet,a sa
referee pointed out,in the realworld therearem anyr easonsforaunitary model to
bem isspecified,on top of the non-respectof the collectiven atureo fh ousehold
behavior.One of them relatest od ynamics,a notherone tothe wayin which
householdsapproximatethe role of taxation and transfers in theirchoices.Estimated
preferencesaccountfort hatlimited rationality and theirparameters counteract,to
some extent,the full accountof taxation imposed byt he model. Here,b ehavioris
statica nd incorporatest he taxs ystem fully:T he useo fartificiald ataa llows torule
out theseo thers ourcesof misspecification and improvest he assessmentof the
unitary model. Admittedly,a notherr esearchg oalcould betotheoretically
characterizethe sets of preferencesand bargaining rulesforw hichd istortionsdo or
do notoccur,b ut itisbeyond our presentpurpose.
However,the main reason whyw ed on otperformthe symmetricexerciseo f
simulating unitary dataa nd analyzing distortionsfrom the useo fcollectivem odels
is:T he unitary model isr egularlyr ejected in the empiricall iterature 2 .
Wef ocus on the analysisof taxr eformsbecausethist ype of exerciseo ften
motivatest he estimation of household preferencep arameters.Our results showt hat
even the design of revenuen eutralreformsmaybeh eavilydistorted byt he useo fa
unitary model on collectived ata.
Inthe following section,webrieflypresentt he twom odels.Inthe third
section,wee xplain howt he simulated datasets areg enerated. Theseared escribed
in the fourthsection. The econometricspecification of the estimated unitary model,
whichd raws on vanSoest (1995) isdiscussed in the fifthsection. Estimation and
policys imulation results ared iscussed in the sixthsection,withf our subsections
presenting the estimates,theiru sei np redicting labors upplies,a nd the positive
and normativeanalysisof taxr eforms,respectively.
1 Thesep apers,published in aspeciali ssueo fthe Reviewof the Economicsof the Household,a re
hereafterr eferred toast he REHO papers.
2 See Browning and Chiappori( 1998) and Vermeulen (2002)f ors everalreferences.9
UNITARY MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY
The representation of household behavior
Inthiss ection webrieflypresentt he unitary and collectivem odelsof allocation
of leisureand consumption of anaggregateg ood att he household level.For
simplicity,wef ocus on childless married couples.
Unitary models
Unitary modelsassume thatt he household maximizesauniqueutility function,
independentof pricesand incomes.Theyalsoassume the pooling of familyincomes.
Thus,fort hesem odels,the allocationsared educed from the maximizationo fa
utility function underbudgetand time constraints:
where c i, l i, w i, y , H and T representagent i ’s( i = f , m ,forw ife and husband,
respectively)consumption,leisured emand and gross wage rate,the couple’s
unearned income,the maximumworktime and the totaltime in aweek. The
maximumn umberof hoursof workwasintroduced fornumericalreasons,b ut it
could bej ustified byt he existenceo fl egalconstraints.Function g (.),whichd escribes
the taxs ystem,isassumed tog enerateconvexbudgets ets.While thisr estrictioncan
easilyberelaxed fort he unitary model,thisisnot(yet)the casef ort he collective
model. The utility function U (.) isincreasingi ni ts arguments and quasi-concave.
Withthe unitary model,the intrahousehold distribution of resourcesplays no
role.Yett he question of intra-familyr edistributiono fi ncomescanbecruciali n
determining household choices(see e.g. Lundberg etal.,1996)and answers are
importantif institutionsw antt oconductefficientand faireconomica nd social
policies(see e.g. Haddadand Kanbur,1990). Collectivem odelscano ffers uch
answers.
Collectivem odels
Inthesem odels,c onsumption choicesared erived byassumingo nlyPareto
optimality of allocations,a nd thiss ingle apriori assumption definest he collective
rationality conceptu sed.FollowingChiappori( 1988),wef ocus on the casewhere
individuals’p referencesaree goistic(eachspouse’su tility isonlydefined on own
consumption and leisure). Inthatcase,a nd foralinearhousehold budgetr estriction,
household behaviorcanberepresented sequentially,usingane xplicits haring rule for
the unearned income. Chiapporishows thatindividualp referencesand the sharing
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caseo fn on linear,b ut convex,b udgets ets hasbeen introduced byDonni (2003):F or
egoisticindividualst he individualp referencesand the unearned income sharing rule
canstill bei dentified uptoanadditiveconstant(see alsoBeninger,2003).
Inthe caseo fe goisticpreferences,c ollectivem odelsw ithconvexbudgets ets have
the following centralized representation:
Ifthe relativeweightof the husband, λ ,isconstant,model (2)i saspecialcaseo f
aunitary model,withseparability in the partition ( c f, l f),( c m , l m ),apointt owhichwe
shall returni nthe fifthsection. Alternatively,the sequential representation is 3 :
wherei s i ’simplicit(ors hadow)wage att he optimum:
Ifwed efine the household’simplicitu nearned income,, as:
theree xists ani mplicitincome sharing rule whichd eterminesas
,suchthatt he sequentialrepresentation (3)i sequivalentt o
the centralized form( 4) of the model. The equivalencecanbeshownwiththe
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UNITARY MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY
Ino ur simulations,the implicitincome sharing rule (.) will berelated tothe
effectivesharing rule whichthe spousesu setoshareg ross unearned income. This
sharing rule isdefined as
where y f denotest he wife’ss hareo fg ross unearned income.
Simulation of collectived ata
Datawereg enerated from the following specification of the sequential
representation (3)o fthe collectivem odel:
where. The justification forpreferring the
sequentialrepresentation in thisexercisei st hatitiscomputationallys impler,
especiallyfort he casesof absenceo ftaxation and of individualtaxation,described later
in thiss ection. The chosen functionalf ormf ort he individualutility functionsis:
where k i denotest he marginalp ropensity toconsume,a nd isaminimuml evel of
consumption,a ssumed identicalf orall individuals.Without the introduction of ,
preferencesw ould beh omothetic, arestriction whichi su niversallyempirically
rejected.
Tod escribethe simulationsprecisely,wen eed toe xplain the generation of the
variablesand parameters needed tocomputeo ptimalallocationson the basisof
equations(7)and (8),a nd tospecifyt he budgetconstraints g i.Parameters ettingsand
variable generation ared escribed in appendixA.Ino rdert ospecifyt he budget
constraintin (7),wef irst define the sharing rule forgross unearned income (equation
(6)). Weassume thatgross unearned income iss hared in proportion tog ross wages:
Thischoicei smotivated,withd rasticsimplifications,b yr esults from empirical
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sharing rule byletting itdepend on actualunearned incomesw ould probably
strengthen the distortionsduetothe useo fthe unitary representation,b ecauseo fi ts
implication of income pooling. Howeveritt urnsout thatt he simple choicem ade
heresufficest op roducee videnceo fsubstantiald istortions.Anotherr efinementt hat
would increased istortionsw ould make the sharing rule explicitlydependenton the
taxs ystem. Forexample,D onni (2003)p roposest oallowt he sharing rule tod epend
on asetof variablesdescribing the taxs ystem (suchasasetof the marginaltax
rates). Asimilarapproachi st aken upi nthe REHO papers and in Beninger etal.
(2007).
Next weturntothe taxs ystem. Inthe absenceo ftaxation (linearbudget
constraint),weh ave:
Inthe caseo f personal orindividualtaxation withapiecewisel inearprogressive
taxs chedule, i ’sdisposable income ( i = f , m )i s:
wherei s i ’sgross income:V ectoris
thevectorofmarginaltaxratesand isthecorrespondingvectorof
taxbrackets forindividualtaxation. Thereare t p taxbrackets and s represents the
bracketforw hichi fand if s = t p .Inthatcase,the
assumptionsmade implycompleteseparation of the problemss olved byt he two
spouses.
Inthe caseo f common orjointt axation withapiecewisel inearprogressive
taxation rule, i ’sdisposable income is:
wherei s i ’scontribution tothe totaltaxliability I c of the household,wherethe
latterisgiven by:
wherei shousehold gross income. Notationsfort he
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UNITARY MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY
assume thatt he taxliability of the household iss hared proportionatelyt og ross
incomes, i.e. .Thisassumption isarbitrary but itist he most
convenientr ule wecould think of 4 .
The numericalvaluesw echoosef ort he taxparameters are:
, S p =( 0,5000,10000)and S c =( 0,7800,15000),soast o
ensurerevenuen eutrality (approximately). All magnitudespertain toaweek,except
the hourlyw age rate. Numbers werechosen withFrenchFrancsin mind.
The collectivem odel thus defined isperfectlydeterministic.Itisnotcleart ous
whetherornott hisfeaturesystematicallyputs the unitary model in amore
disadvantageous situation thani fsome noiseh adbeen introduced in the model.
Simulated collectived atasets
Weh aveg enerated datafor2 000 couplesin three differentcases:N otaxation,
jointt axation and individualtaxation. Eachi ndividuali scharacterized byano bserved
heterogeneity factorw hichi st he marginalp ropensity toconsume,a nd hasab udget
constraint g i ( l f, l m , w f, w m , y )whichd ependson the taxs ystem and on the sharing
rule and hasasarguments bothl eisured emands,b othg ross wage ratesand
household unearned income 5 .Given thesef unctions,the optimall abors upplyand
consumption of eachspousei scomputed foreachtaxs ituation bys olving (7)f oreach
household,withrealvalued solutions,using Mathematica 4.0 6 .Asummary of the
results isgiven in table 1,a nd amorecompleted escription isgiven in appendixB.
4 Notethatitisjust asarbitrary (although realistic)toassume fort he caseo fi ndividual
taxation thateachspousep ays hisowntax:Adifferents haring rule would beconceivable.
5 Sinceweh aved rawnthe wagesof husband and wife independently,therei sno assortative
matching in thesed atasets.
6 Att hiss tage continuous labors uppliesand consumptionsaresimulated.
Table 1. Simulated data(means)
Variable Symbol Notax.Jointt ax.Indiv.tax.
Herw orkh ours h f 46.8 39.642.8
Hisw orkh ours h m 45.8 38.640.7
Household cons. c 13,730 10,695 11,026
Herw age w f 77.3
Hisw age w m 102.3
Unearned income y 5,054
I i
c I
c ⁄ R i
c R
c ⁄ =
τ p τ c (0,.3,.5) ==
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Figure1 . Weeklyhours of work
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UNITARY MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY
Regardless of the taxs ituation,the wife’slabors upply, h f,ison average alittle
highert hanthe husband’s, h m .Thisisnotw hatisobserved forchildless couplesin
typicald atasets,a nd amorecomplexs pecification of the sharing rule,ort he
specification of differentpreferencesformalesand females,would probablyallowu s
tocome upwithsimulated datamorecloselymimicking established stylized facts.
But given the natureo fthisexercise,thisisatmost of minorimportance. Notethat
herethe onlydifferencebetween husbandsand wivesist hatmen haveo naverage
higherw ages,whichtranslatesintoahighers hareo funearned income,a nd thus into
lowerlabors upply,given thatleisurei sanormalg ood in the preferencesconsidered.
Whentheindividualsarenottaxed,womenaremorelikelytopreferapart-timejob
(about 20 hours weekly),ort oworko vertime. Men areslightlymorel ikelyt oworkan
“average” numberof hours (30 to4 0w eeklyhours). But despitethe wage differential,
the distribution of labors upplyisr oughlyt he same forbothsexes.Compared toreal
dataformost countries,labors upplyherei sr atherhigh,withamajority of individuals
working between 30 and 70 hours perw eek. About 7%d on otparticipate:T heseare
essentiallyindividualsw ithahigh level of unearned income. Individualsw ithahigh
marginalp ropensity toconsume areunderrepresented among non participants.
The introduction of taxation hasalarge disincentivei mpact,b ut thisv ariesw ith
individualand household characteristics.Individualsw ithh igh wagesand high
unearned income arem oreaffected,while the poorest aren otaffected atall.
Inthe specificc aseo fthe introduction of individualtaxation,c onsidert wo
identicalwomen (same marginalp ropensity toconsume,same wage and household
unearned income),b ut assume thatt heirhusbandsaree ndowed withd ifferentw ages.
The womanwhoseh usband hast he lowerw age supports alargerdisincentivee ffect
thanthe otherone,b ecauseo fthe specification of the income sharing rule.
Inthe caseo fj ointt axation the disincentivee ffectiseven larger,a nd again,b etter
endowed individualsarem oreaffected. The newaspectherei st hat,in caseo falarge
wage gapbetween the spouses,the poorerone will alsoreduceh isorherlabors upply:
Ac omparativelyloww age ratei mpliesinequality on twoaccounts within the
household:A sr egardsw age income, w i ( T – l i),a nd asr egardst he sharing of unearned
income, y i.Jointt axation isr elativelyu nfavorable tothe less well endowed spouse,
ast he latterbears part of the taxburden of the richers pouse. Again,individualsw ith
ahigh marginalp ropensity toconsume arem oreaffected thano thers.
The factt hatjointt axation hasalargerdisincentivee ffectt hani ndividualtaxation
doesnotr esultfrom differencesin taxr evenue:T he taxbrackets havebeen specified in
suchawayt hatt axr evenuesarevirtuallyidenticali nbothsituations(see thirdsection
and appendixD). Inf act,itt urnsout thatjointt axation ismoref avorable for
households thani ndividualtaxation:F ort he taxparameters used hereand for
identicalg ross income (labors uppliesand unearned income fixed),ac ouple pays more
taxin the caseo fi ndividualtaxation thani nthe caseo fj ointt axation (about 25%
more). However,jointt axation isr elativelymoref avorable tothe richers pouse( see
sixthsection,fourthsubsection).D.BENINGER, F.LAISNEY
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Wen owexamine morespecificallyt he impactof differentv ariablesand
parameters on “collective” reactionst othe introduction of one type of taxation ort he
other,a nd begin withh ousehold unearned income, y .Asleisurei sanormalg ood for
eachi ndividual,leisured emand l i ( i = f , m )will increasewith y .However,in the case
of jointt axation thereareo thereffects atw ork,b ecausetherei sadegree of
interdependencei nthe behaviorof the spouses.Itt hen becomesdifficultt osay
apriori whatt he impactof ac hange in y will be.
The effectof ac hange in the wage rate w i on labors upply h i iseven more
ambiguous,a sitdependson the othercharacteristicsof the individual( marginal
propensity toconsume,spouse’sw age and household unearned income). Yetour
simulated datashowgenerallyanegativeassociation between wagesand labors upply.
Thisisduetothe factt hatt he income effectof ac hange in the wage isr einforced by
the corresponding change in the individual’ss hareo funearned income. Inp articular,
individualsw iththe lowest wagesoften havearelativelyhigh labors upply.Still,a
cleareffectist hatani ncreasei n w i ( i = f , m )h asanegativei mpacton the spouse’s
labors upply h j ( j = f , m , j ≠ i ),b ecauseo fthe specification of the sharing rule (9).
Ofcourse,a ni ncreasei nthe marginalp ropensity toconsume k i induces
individualst oworkm ore.
The impactof changesin parameterv alueson c i arel ess ambiguous.Therei sa
positivei mpactof y , w i and k i on c i.Bycontrast, w j ( j = f , m , j ≠ i )h asanegative
impactt hrough the sharing rule. And,a lmost needless tosay,introducing taxation
hasanegativee ffecton consumption.
Econometricspecification of unitary model
Fort he unitary model,wef ollowv anSoest (1995) in specifying adirectt ranslog
household utility function,a nd adopthisdiscretechoiceapproach. The latterisw ell
adapted tothe estimation of preferencep arameters in the presenceo fn onlinear
budgetconstraints.Analternativewould betospecifyt he unitary model in sucha
wayt hatitw ould correspond tospecification (2)withac onstantr elativeweightfor
the husband. Whethert hisw ould bei nf avour of the unitary model,in the senseo f
improving its capacity totrackthe collectived ata, isdoubtful. Herewep refert o
placeo urselvesin the situation of ane conometricianwho treats the dataa sif they
wereg enerated byaunitary model. Inp articular,thisleadsu st oconsideronly
aggregateconsumption,whichi st ypicallyavailable in surveydata, rathert hanthe
individualconsumptionsavailable in our simulated collectived ata.Anaturalstance,
given thatour focus herei sprimarilyempirical,rathert hananalytical–wewantt o
pointt othe distortionsentailed byestimation of aunitary model of the type
generallyu sed in empiricalresearchwhen the dataa reg enerated byac ollective
model –i st ospecifyafairlyflexible unitary model rathert hanconstraining it
apriori sothatitisnested in our collectivem odel. Estimating model (2)with
constantw ould yield results in the unitary setting mored irectlycomparable with
the collectivem odel,a nd thus leadtoab etteru nderstanding of the sourcesof
the discrepancies,b ut itw ould necessitateusing information on individual
λ17
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consumptions,whichi st ypicallymissing in household surveys.Wearen otawareo f
anyempiricalstudyhaving estimated ahousehold utility function ass pecified in (2).
Our specification of the household utility function thus takest he form:
where,a nd Û (.) represents the household’s
utility function. The 3 × 3matrix , iss ymmetric,
and b =( β c, β f, β m )’ isavectorof parameters.Subscripts c , f , m ,a reassociated to lc ,
llf and llm ,respectively.Consumption c results from the leisurechoicest hrough the
budgetconstraint:
c = g ( l f, l m , w f, w m , y ).
Wei ntroduceo nlyone type of observed heterogeneity,c onnected withthe
existenceo fthree possible valuesfort he marginalp ropensity toconsume.Thisw ill
take the formo ftwoseriesof three dummies,one fort he wife,a nd one fort he
husband (see appendixA),a nd weallow b tod epend linearlyon theseo bserved
characteristics.
Weassume thateachi ndividualh as n =1 1p ossible choicesforhisorherw eekly
labors upply: h i = T – l i =0,10,…,100.Thisy ieldsasetof N =1 21choicesfort he
leisured emand pairs ( l f, l m )o fthe spouses.Ifd enotest he utility
generated bycombination ,a dding ane rrort erm ε j,wed efineactual
utility derived from combination j as:
Specifyingthe extremevalued istribution for ε j,defined by:
leadst othe multinomiall ogitmodel:
Expression( 17)represents the household’scontribution tothe likelihood.
Inthe absenceo funobserved heterogeneity in the data, therewould onlybe
marginalreturnst othe estimation of morerefined specificationsallowing fors uch
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Train (2000)o rt he heterogeneity augmented logitmodel of Chesherand Santos
Silva(2002). Similarly,including fixed costs of workalong the linesof Gong and
vanSoest (2002)would appearartificial,a sno suchcosts arep resentin the data.
The following restrictionss hould besatisfied:
where,, with x , y = c , l f, l m .This
restriction isac onsequenceo fthe quasi-concavity of the household utility function
and of the factt hat Û isincreasing in c (see. e.g.vanSoest etal.,1990). Thislast
assumption isv erified if:
Similarmonotonicity restrictionsapplyw .r.t.the otherarguments of Û .
Results
Inthiss ection wef irst givethe estimation results fort he unitary models,a nd the
predictionsof the labors uppliesbased on thesee stimates.Wethen performthe
analysisof the differentfiscalreforms,using the twotypesof modelsconsidered,a nd
stress differencesin positiveand normativeaspects of the corresponding evaluation.
Estimation of unitary models
Maximuml ikelihood estimatesof the parameters of the utility function specified in
the fifthsection,a nd based on equation (17),a reg iven in appendixC.Estimation was
conducted in the three cases“absenceo ftaxation”,“jointt axation” and “individual
taxation”,yielding three vectors of estimatesdenoted ,a nd ,respectively.
The reason forperforming the three estimationsist he following. Sincethe individual
underlyingpreferencesareunchangedthroughouttheexercise,estimationresultsatthe
level of the household should in principle bef airlys imilarin all three situations.Ifwe
find thatestimatesforhousehold preferencep arameters areaffected byt he formo fthe
household budgetconstraint,thisw ill resultmainlyfrom the misspecification
embodied in the unitary representation of collectiveh ouseholds 7 .
(18)
(19)
7 Ifwee stimated the collectivem odel on the three datasets,wecould notexpectt of ind
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Following vanSoest,wei nteracted the dummiesdescribing the marginal
propensity toconsume of eachspouseo nlyw iththatindividual’sleisured emand (see
appendixA).
The estimatesdo differs ignificantly.Admittedly,amorethorough comparison of
estimation results could focus on marginale ffects combining the linearand quadratic
coefficients.However,the differencesw en otearel arge enough foru st od ispense
withthatfurthers tep.
The estimated coefficients ,, differconsiderablydepending on
the datasetu sed –and thus on the taxs ystem. The coefficients of leisured emand are
all significantin one caseo nly,thatof individualtaxation. The signsof significant
β coefficients forjointt axation agree withthosef orindividualtaxation. But all
significant β coefficients forlabors upplyin the absenceo ftaxation arep ositive,
whereast heyaren egativef orindividualtaxation. The coefficientiss tronglyand
significantlynegativei nall cases,b ut its magnitude doublesw hen going from
absenceo ftaxation toi ndividualtaxation,withthe valuef orjointt axation
inbetween. Notethat,even if the linearimpactof consumption on utility (when the
household isnott axed) iss tronglynegative,the overall effectof consumption on
household utility ispositivef oralmost all observations:C ondition (19) iss atisfied,
exceptforafewhouseholdsw herebothspouseshaveavery large labors upply
(connected withl oww agesand unearned income),especiallyin the caseo fi ndividual
taxation. The situation asr egardslabors uppliesisless favorable,though.
Quadraticeffects,b othd irectand cross effects,a ll significantin all three
estimations,a realittle morestable w.r.t.the taxs ystem,a sno sign reversalsappear
here. The directeffects (coefficients α ii)concerningl eisureh avesimilarmagnitudes,
although theyarealittle weakerin the caseo fi ndividualtaxation. Coefficient α cc is
moresensitivetothe taxs ystem,a nd the same holdsforcross effects (coefficients α ij,
with) ,especiallyt he cross effects consumption-leisured emand. Estimation
results concerningthe quadraticeffects aref airlys imilart othoseo btained withreal
data(see forexample vanSoest (1995),forDutchd ata, and Wolf( 1998),forGerman
data). The restrictiono fq uasiconcavity of the utility function (18) iss atisfied for
most observationsin eachcase.
Predictionsw ithunitary models
Thesee stimatescanbeused tom ake predictionsof labors upplies,obtained by
computingchoicep robabilitieson the basisof equation (17)and takingthe category
withthe highest choicep robability ast he chosen one. Notethat,withthree vectors
of estimatesand three datasets,wee xamine nine sets of predictions.
Predicted labors upplieshavealowerdispersionthane ffectivel abors upplies,a nd
amoresymmetricdistribution (see figure2forw omen;s imilarr esults areo btained
formen;notethatin the comparisons,weh aved iscretized the collectivel abour
supplies,in the same categories0 ,10,...,100 asfort he predictionsfrom the unitary
models). Inp articulart he numberof nonworkingi ndividualsisu nderestimated in all
casesand forall predictions.The estimation of householdl abors upplyon the basis




Figure2. Actualand predicted weeklyhours of work
Note: Predicted labors upplies1,2and 3correspond tothe useo fp arameterv ectors ,a nd ,
respectively.
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of realworld data(see forinstancevanSoest,1995) alsoi ndicatesano verestimation
of the participation rates.VanSoest arguest hatt hisphenomenon mayr esultfrom
the endogeneity of gross wage ratesand from characteristicsof the demand side of
the labormarket,a nd proposesac orrection taking accountof restrictionson hours.
But hereg ross wagesarep erfectlyexogenous and knownf orall agents,a nd labor
supplyisnotconstrained in anyw ay.Thus,the overestimation of participation rates
doesnotr esultfrom the neglectof institutionalf actors in the specification.
Predictionsobtained withe stimated coefficients and tend tounderestimate
labors upplies(exceptpredictionsu sing in the caseo fj ointt axation). The
underestimation islargerw hen isu sed. Predictionsbased on overestimatep art-
time workand underestimate‘ overtime’. Yetall vectors aresupposed tobe
consistentestimatesof the same preferencep arameters,a nd given the fairlylarge
sample size,predictionsobtained withthesevectors should notbetoo dissimilar.
The predictionslook betterw hen the coefficientv ectoru sed correspondst othe
situation described (forexample using top redictlabors uppliesin the caseo f
jointt axation),in the sensethatmoreagents havei denticalp redicted and actual
labors upplies.
The differencess howni nf igure2mays eem minor,b ut its hould bestressed that
theseareo nlydifferencesin the marginald istributionsof hours worked. Even if these
werei dentical,therecould still bei mportantdifferencesatt he individuall evel.
Analysisof fiscalreforms:P ositiveaspects
Tables2and 3s howt hatt he adjustmentof labors uppliesfollowing the
introduction of taxation isalsop oorlypredicted using the unitary model,especially
in the caseo fj ointt axation. Forexample,withthe unitary model atleast
110w omen arep redicted too fferu nchanged numbers of hours,whereast hey
actuallyr educetheirw eeklylabors upplyby10hours ormoreaftert he introduction
of jointt axation,a nd morewomen arep redicted tok eep theirlabors upply
unchanged thani sactuallyt he case( see table 2). The reduction in hours offered after
the introduction of anyt ype of taxation isu nderestimated byt he unitary models.
Tables2and 3alsoshowt hatpredictionsobtained withcoefficients and
areslightlyw orsethanthoseo btained with,especiallyw hen isu sed to
predictt he effectof introducing jointt axation and isu sed forindividual
taxation.
Analysisof fiscalreforms:N ormativeaspects
Webegin withthe taxr eformanalysisbased on the collectivem odel. Figures3 .1
and 3.2s howt he distribution of individual welfareg ains,heren egative,b ydecile of
the distribution of gross income in the baseline situation without taxation (weshow
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onlyfiguresformen,a st he figuresforw omen arevery similar). Asexpected in the
absenceo fredistribution of taxr evenues,the introduction of taxation hasanegative
impacton welfare. Yetagents withl owincomesdo notincur lossesw hen individual
taxation isintroduced,a st heyaren ott axed atall. But some of them areaffected byt he
introduction of jointt axation:T heirs pousei sr iche nough fort he couple tobetaxed.
Figures3 .3and 3.4 showt he welfareconsequencesof the movef rom individual
toj ointt axation,formen and women. The factt hatindividualtaxation isr elatively
moreadvantageous thanj ointt axation forlowincome individualsisconfirmed. By
contrast,high income agents arerelativelybetteroff withj ointt axation,b ecausei t
allows them tosharethe burden of taxation withthe less well endowed spouse.
Individualtaxation ist hus relativelymorei nteresting forw omen,a st heirw age rates
areo naverage 20%l owert hanm en’s.
Table 4shows thatin termsof welfare,62%o fthe women gain in the movef rom
jointt oi ndividualtaxation,a nd some 20%arei ndifferent.The remaining 18%
preferjointt axation. Bycontrast,morem en preferjointt axation (about 36%),17%
arei ndifferentand the rest (47%) gainsfrom individualtaxation.
Table 2. Effectof the introduction of jointt axation unitary versus collectivem odel (women)
≤ –30 –20 –1 00 Total
–1 03 43 406 143595




≤ –30 –20 –1 00 Total
≤ –1 03 49 381 111 545
010967 38 591 14 35
≥ 100 8572 0
Total1 315311 247102 000
2.using estimates
≤ –30 –20 –1 00 Total
≤ –1 06 38 347 110501
07 109770 589 14 75
≥ 100 67 11 24
Total1 315311 247102 000
3.using estimates
Notes: Columnss howt he actualchange in labors upplyw hen joint(resp. individual) taxation isintroduced,
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Therearerelativelyfewcouplesforw hom the direction of the relativeadvantage
of eachf iscalsystem isidenticalf orbothp artners.This“conflictual” situation is
essentiallyduetothe wage rated ifferentialand the ensuing differencei ni ncomes:
The richerpartnerfindsjointt axation advantageous.Foronly42%o fthe couples
bothp artners fall in the same category (winner,loser,indifferent)i nthe switch
between the twosystems.Thesearep artlyhouseholdsw hosem embers arei ndifferent
toe achtaxs ystem anyway,a st heirincomesaretoo lowt obetaxed.
Descriptivestatisticson the subsamplesof winners and losers (nots hownh erei n
ordert og ain space) indicatethatt he marginalp ropensity toconsume hasan
importantimpacton the welfaree ffects of the fiscalsystems.Winners from joint
taxation haveo naverage ahighermarginalp ropensity toconsume. Bycontrast,
household unearned income hasno notable impacton the relativeadvantage of one
system overt he otherin termsof the sign of welfarechanges.
Wen owt urntothe welfarei mpactof the reformsasdescribed on the basisof the
unitary models.Figures4showt he distribution ofhouseholdutility gainsbydecile of
the distribution of gross household income in the baseline situation without taxation,
Table3. Effectoftheintroductionofindividualtaxationunitaryversuscollectivemodel(women)
–20 –1 00 10Total
–1 019 209 184 2414
044 473 1010 015 27
102 354 0 59
Total65685 1248 22 000
1. using estimates
–20 –1 00 10Total
–1 018 212 1391 370
047465 1028 11 541
≥ 100 88 1 0 89
Total65685 1248 22 000
2.using estimates
–20 –1 00 10Total
–1 019 205 1172 343
045 468 1000 015 13
≥ 1011 2131 0 144
Total65685 1248 22 000
3.using estimates
Notes: Columnss howt he actualchange in labors upplyw hen joint(resp. individual) taxation isintroduced,
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withutility gainscomputed from the unitary models 8 .Results concerning the
introductionoftaxation(jointorindividual)arenotinconflictwiththoseobtainedwith
the collectiverepresentation of the household. However,results apparentlydiverge as
regardst he movef rom individualtoj ointt axation:W hereast he richest individuals
werem ostlyw inners fort he collectivem odel,the majority of the richest households
lose.Thisimpressionwillbetemperedwhenwelookatindividualsinhouseholds.
Theseresults ared escribed in table 4,whichcomparest he qualitativewelfare
effects (gain,loss,indifference) of the movef rom individualtoj ointt axation,a nd of
the inversem ove,a spredicted bybothm odels.Notethatbothp anelsof table 4aren ot
exactlys ymmetrical:T he numberof householdslosing in the movef rom individualto
jointt axation should in principle coincide withthe numberof winners in the reverse
Figure3. Gainsin individualutility fordifferentfiscalreformscollectivem odel
Notes: The figuresr epresentmeanutility gainsbydecile of the pre-reformg ross individuali ncome
distribution fort he introduction of jointt axation (Figure3.1),individualtaxation (Figure3.2)and fort he
movef rom individualtaxation toj ointt axation (Figures3 .3and 3.4),forw omen (Figure3.3)and men
(Figures3 .1,3.2and 3.4). The verticall iness howt he range of gains,the rectangless howinterquartile
intervals,the solid line shows average gains,a nd the dotted liness howconfidencei ntervals(±twicethe
standarde rrorof the mean).
8 The parameteru sed correspondsin eachcasetothe initialtaxs ystem considered.
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move,whatevert he estimateused. Thisasymmetry results from the more
pronounced underestimation of labors uppliesw iththanwith. Forabout 100
households(5%),the predicted qualitativewelfaree ffects are contradictory,in the
sensethat,in the collectivef ramework,a tleast one household membergainsin a
reformand the partnerdoesnotlose,whereasu sing the unitary model the household
losesorisindifferent.Fort he majority of these,b othspousesarei ndifferentt othe
reform,whereast he household appears tol osei nthe unitary framework:T he
discrepancyr esults from the poorquality of unitary predictionsof labors upply
responses.
The “conflictual” situation uncovered byt he collectivem odel ismasked byt he
unitary representation of household behavior(see alsothe simple example of Brett
(1998),showing thatParetoi mproving reformsin aunitary setting aren ot
necessarilyParetoi mproving in ac ollectivesetting). The relativeadvantage of atax
system in the collectivem odel isessentiallylinked tothe intra-familyincome
differential,rathert hano nlyt ototalh ousehold income.
Figure4 . Household utility gainsfordifferentfiscalreforms,unitary model
Note: The figuresr epresenthousehold utility gainsbydecile of the distribution of pre-reformg ross
household income aftert he introduction of jointt axation (4.1),individualtaxation (4.2)and in the move
from individualtoj ointt axation (4.3).
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Conclusion
Onthe basisof datasimulated for2 000collectiveh ouseholdsin three different
fiscalsituations,weh avep rovided evidenceo nthe distortionsconnected withthe use
of estimatesfrom aflexible unitary model fort he evaluationo ff iscalreforms.
Firstly,the unitary model leadst of airlydiverginge stimatesof household
“preferences”d ependingo nthe budgetconstraintfaced byt he households; thisis
inasmuchp roblematica st hesee stimatesaresubsequentlyu sed ast rulyr eflecting
preferencesin policyevaluatione xercises.
Secondly,even usingf oreachreformthe unitary estimatescorrespondingtothe
departuresituation,wef ind significantdiscrepanciesin the predictiono fp ositive
effects of fiscalreforms(adjustmentin the labors uppliesof the spouses,a nd
computation of taxr evenues). Inp articular,the latterpoints hows thatu singa
unitary representationm ayleadton on-negligible errors in the designo frevenue
neutralreforms.
Finally,the comparison of the evaluationo fwelfaree ffects of fiscalreformsw ith
the collectiveand unitary modelsr evealss ubstantiald ivergences,b ut alsop oints to
Table 4. Jointand individualtaxation:C omparison of the collectiveand unitary models
f + f 0 f –
Total
m + m 0 m – m + m 0 m – m + m 0 m –
hous+ 533 217 51 49 1 377 23 738
hous0 11 0 4 216 2 2 211 239
hous– 12 141 218 16 286 18 539 1023
Total73 63 58 572 8319 66522 5532 000
f – f 0 f +
Total
m – m 0 m + m – m 0 m + m – m 0 m +
hous– 530 214 46 391 387 33 728
hous0 15 1 9 230 4 2 315 270
hous+ 11 143 214 14 276 16535 1002
Total73 63 58 572 8319 66522 5532 000
Total f ( f – )4 01( f 0 )359 ( f + )1 2402 000
Total m ( m – )729( m 0 )341 ( m + )9 30 20 00
Notes: The first panel correspondst othe movef rom individualtoj ointt axation,the second panel tothe
inversem ove. Rows:winning (hous+ ),indifferent(hous0 ),a nd losing households(hous– )o nthe basisof
coefficients estimated in the departuresituation, i.e. fort he first panel and fort he second.
Columns:winning females( f + )and males( m + )–resp. f – , m – and f 0 , m 0 forlosers orindifferentindividuals,
on the basisof the simulated collectived ata.Bold (italic)e ntriesdenoteagreement(contradiction) between
collectiveand unitary models.
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the deep differencesin theirfoundation itself. Using aunitary model leadst he
investigatort on eglectr esourceallocation within the household,a nd thismaymask
the factt hatareformthats eemsadvantageous foramajority of couplescani nreality
generatei ncreased tensionsand inequality within asubstantialn umberof
households.Conversely,using the collectivem odel mayleadtoe xaggerated emphasis
on purelyindividualaspects.
Ani mportantdevelopmentof thiss tudy,namelyt og enerated atain arealistic
wayfordifferentcountries,taking accountof the existing fiscalsystemsand reforms
underdiscussion,a sw ell asof the structureand the population,a nd toi nvestigate
howimportantt he distortionsillustrated herem aybef ors ixEuropeancountries,is
documented in the REHO papers.
Inf utureresearch,efforts should bei nvested in the estimation of collective
modelsw ithn on-participation and taxation. Papers going in thisdirection are
Beninger(2007),D onni (2007)and Vermeulen (2006). Aseeminglyattractivep ath
would betoresort toi ndirectinference( Gouriéroux etal.,1993; Dridi and Renault,
2000; Dridi etal.,2007), i.e. tof ormulateanauxiliary model,a nd toe stimatethe
initialm odel byminimizing the discrepancybetween estimatesobtained from the
auxiliary model on the originald ataon the one hand,a nd on datasimulated withthe
initialm odel on the otherhand. Theoreticalresults on the identification of collective
models,ort he lacko fi t,suggest thatt he simultaneous useo fi nformation from
singles,a nd corresponding identifying assumptions,will beh elpful.
References
AppsP.F.,R eesR.( 1999). Individual versus jointt axation in modelsw ithh ousehold
production, Journalo fPoliticalEconomy, 107,pp. 393-403.
AppsP.F.,R eesR.( 1997). Collectivel abors upplyand household production, Journal
of PoliticalEconomy, 105,pp. 178-190.
AppsP.F.,R eesR.( 1996). Labors upply,household production and intra-family
welfared istribution, Journalo fPublicE conomics, 60,pp. 199-220.
AppsP.F.,R eesR.( 1988). Taxation and the household, Journalo fPublicE conomics, 35,
pp. 355-369.
ArrowK.( 1951). Choixcollectif etpréférencesindividuelles, Paris,C almann-Lévy.
Bargain O.,B eblo M.,B eningerD.,B lundell R.,C arrascoR.,C hiuriM.C.,L aisneyF.,
Lechene V.,L ongobardi E.,M oreauN.,M yckM.,R uiz-Castillo J.and
Vermeulen F.( 2006). Doest he representation of household behaviormatterfor
welfareanalysisof tax-benefitpolicies?Ani ntroduction, Reviewof Economicsof
the Household, 4,pp. 96-112.D.BENINGER, F.LAISNEY
28
BeckerG.S.( 1991). AT reatiseo nthe Family, Cambridge (MA.),H arvardUniversity
Press.
BeningerD.( 2007). Would the WFTC help the Germanf amiliest oconciliate
children and work? Empiricale videncebased on ac ollectivem odel,mimeo,
ZEW Mannheim.
BeningerD.( 2003). Income taxation and the collectiverepresentation of the
household:T heory and empiricale vidence,D octoralthesis,U niversitéLouis
Pasteur,S trasbourgI.
BeningerD.,B argain O.,B eblo M.,B lundell R.,C arrascoR.,C hiuriM.C.,L aisneyF.,
Lechene V.,L ongobardi E.,M oreauN.,M yckM.,R uiz-Castillo J.and
Vermeulen F.( 2006). Taxr eformanalysis:T he choiceo fthe representation of
household decision processesdoesmatter, Reviewof Economicsof the Household, 4,
pp. 159-180.
BeningerD.,L aisneyF.and Beblo M.( 2007). Welfareanalysisof fiscalreforms:D oes
the representation of the familydecision process matter?Evidencef or
Germany, Journalf orPopulation Economics, forthcoming.
Ben PorathY.( 1982). Economicsand the family-matcho rmismatch:Areviewof
Becker’s“AT reatiseo nthe Family”, Journalo fEconomicL iterature, 20,
pp. 52-64.
Bergstrom T.C.( 1989). Afreshl ook att he rotten kid theorem and otherhousehold
mysteries, Journalo fPoliticalEconomy, 97,pp. 1138-1159.
Blundell R.,C hiapporiP.-A.,M agnac T.and MeghirC.( 1998). Collectivel abor
supply:H eterogeneity and non-participation,W orking Paper2 0/98,I nstitute
forFiscalStudies,L ondon.
Bourguignon F.( 1999). The cost of children:M ayt he collectiveapproachto
household behaviorhelp?, Journalo fPopulation Economics, 12,pp. 503-521.
Bourguignon F.,B rowning M.,C hiapporiP.-A.and Lechene V.( 1993). Intra
household of consumption:Amodel and some evidencef rom Frenchd ata,
Annalesd’Économie etde Statistique, 29,pp. 137-156.
Brett C.( 1998). Taxr eformand collectivef amilydecision-making, Journalo fPublic
Economics, 70,pp. 425-440.
Browning M.,B ourguignon F.,C hiapporiP.-A.and Lechene V.( 1994). Incomesand
outcomes:Astructuralm odel of intrahousehold allocations, Journalo fPolitical
Economy, 102,pp. 1067-1096.
Browning M.,C hiapporiP.-A.( 1998). Efficientintrahousehold allocations:Ageneral
characterization and empiricaltests, Econometrica, 66,pp. 1241-1278.
ChesherA.,S antosSilvaJ .M.C.( 2002). Tastevariation in discretechoicem odels,
Reviewof EconomicS tudies, 69,pp. 147-168.29
UNITARY MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY
ChiapporiP.-A.( 1997). Introducing household production in collectivem odelslabor
supply, Journalo fPoliticalEconomy, 105,pp. 191-208.
ChiapporiP.-A.( 1992). Collectivel abors upplyand welfare, Journalo fPolitical
Economy, 100,pp. 437-467.
ChiapporiP.-A.( 1988). Rationalh ousehold labors upply, Econometrica, 56,pp. 63-89.
ChiuriM.C.( 1999). Intra-household allocation of time and resources:E mpirical
evidenceo nasample of Italianh ouseholdsw ithyoung children, TMR Progress
Report n° 5,T ilburg.
Deaton D.A.,M uellbauerJ.( 1980). Economicsand ConsumerBehavior, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Donni O.( 2007). Collectivef emale labour supply:T heory and application, Economic
Journal, 117,pp. 94-119.
Donni O.( 2003). Collectiveh ousehold labors upply:N on-participation and income
taxation, Journalo fPublicE conomics, 87(5-6),pp. 1179-1198.
Dridi R.,G uayA.and RenaultE.( 2007). Indirectinferenceand calibration of
dynamicstochasticgenerale quilibriumm odels, Journalo fEconometrics, 136,
pp. 397-430.
Dridi R.,R enaultE.( 2000). Semi-parametricindirectinference,D PS TICERD/
EconometricsEM/00/392,L ondon School of Economics.
Gong X.,vanSoest A.( 2002). Familys tructureand female labour supplyin Mexico
City, Journalo fHumanResources, 37,pp. 163-191.
Gouriéroux C.,M onfort A.and RenaultE.( 1993). Indirectinference, Journalo f
Applied Econometrics, 8,pp. 85-118.
HaddadL.,K anbur R.( 1990). Hows erious isneglectof intrahousehold inequality,
EconomicJ ournal, 100,pp. 65-81.
Hildenbrand W.( 1998). Howr elevantarespecificationsof behavioralrelationson the
micro-level formodelling the time patho fthe population?, EuropeanEconomic
Review, 42,pp. 437-458.
Hildenbrand W.( 1994). MarketDemand:T heory and EmpiricalEvidence, Princeton
(N.J.),P rinceton University Press.
Lechene V.( 1993). Représentation duménage :essaisen micro-économie théoriquee t
appliquée,T hèsed octorale,E HESS, Paris.
LundbergS.J.,P ollakR.A.and WalesT.J.( 1996). Doh usbandsand wivespool their
resources?Evidencef rom the United Kingdom child benefit, Journalo fHuman
Resources, 32,pp. 463-480.D.BENINGER, F.LAISNEY
30
McDonald J.B.( 1984). Some generalized functionsfort he sized istribution of income,
Econometrica, 52,pp. 647-663.
McFadden D.,T rain K.( 2000). Mixed MNL modelsfordiscreteresponse, Journalo f
Applied Econometrics, 15,pp. 447-470.
MyckM.,B argain O.,B eblo M.,B eningerD.,B lundell R.,C arrascoR.,C hiuriM.C.,
LaisneyF.,L echene V.,L ongobardi E.,M oreauN.,R uiz-Castillo J.and
Vermeulen F.( 2006). Taxr eformanalysisu sing collectivem odelsof household
labors upply, Reviewof Economicsof the Household, 4,pp. 129-158.
Samuelson P.A.( 1956). Sociali ndifferencecurves, QuarterlyJournalo fEconomics, 70,
pp. 1-22.
Sen A.K.( 1984). Economicsand the Family ,in:R esources,V aluesand Development,
Cambridge (MA.) and London,H arvardUniversity Press.
vanSoest A.( 1995). Structuralm odelsof familylabors upply:Adiscretechoice
approach, Journalo fHumanResources, 30,pp. 63-88.
vanSoest A.,W oittiezI.and KapteynA.( 1990). Labors upply,income taxesand
hours restrictionsin the Netherlands, Journalo fHumanResources, 25( 3),
pp. 517-558.
Vermeulen F.( 2006). Ac ollectivem odel forfemale labors upplyw ithn on-
participation and taxation, Journalo fPopulation Economics, 19,pp. 99-118.
Vermeulen F.( 2002). Collectiveh ousehold models:P rinciplesand main results,
Journalo fEconomicS urveys, 16,pp. 533-564.
Vermeulen F.,B argain O.,B eblo M.,B lundell R.,C arrascoR.,C hiuriM.C.,L aisney
F.,L echene V.,M oreauN.,M yckM.and Ruiz-Castillo J.( 2006). Collective
modelsof household labors upplyw ithn on convexbudgets ets and non-
participation:Ac alibration approach, Reviewof Economicsof the Household, 4,
pp. 113-127.
Wolf E.( 1998). Doh ours restrictionsmatter?Adiscretef amilylabors upplymodel
withe ndogenous wagesand hours restrictions,Z EW Discussion Paper98-44.31
UNITARY MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY
APPENDIX A
Parameters and variables
The parameterv aluesarecommon toall individuals(like totalavailable time,for
instance),the variablesarep articulart oe achi ndividual( like gross wage rates). Inthe
lattercase,the individualvaluesr esultfrom i.i.d. sampling foreachi ndividual( for
wage ratesand fort he marginalp ropensitiest oconsume) and foreachcouple
(unearned income).
Parameters
The fixed parameters, i.e. minimumconsumption,, totaltime available, T ,a nd
maximalworking time, H ,a recommon tothe whole population. All pertain toa
week. Minimumconsumption perw eek iss ett om onetary units (weh ad
FrenchFrancsperw eek in mind when setting monetary values,b ut the actualunits
reallyarei rrelevant). Totaltime available,in hours,ist he duration of aweekminus the
time devoted tobiologicaln eeds(sleeping,eating,etc.): T =1 20 hours.This
correspondst othe upperbound forleisure. The maximumd uration of worki ss ett o
H =1 00 hours.Notethatw ed on otconsideranydomesticproduction in thismodel.
Variables
Asmentioned above,thesearethe wage rates,unearned incomesand marginal
propensitiest oconsume.
Wage distributionsareh ighlys kewed tothe right,a nd extremelyloww agesare
rarei nthe richcountries(see e.g. Hildenbrand,1994 and 1998). Withthese
characteristicsin mind,wespecifyt he following density fort he wages–thisisa
specialcaseo fthe Fiskd istribution (see e.g. McDonald,1984):
The corresponding cumulativep robability function is:
where d f =4 0and d m =5 0.Expectation,standarde rrorand mode arerespectively
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For unearned income weassume the exponentiald istribution:
with θ =5 000.Expectation,standarde rrorand mode are,a nd
mode ( y )=0
Individualsareassumed toh avee itheralowmarginalp ropensity toconsume
( k i =. 4),oramediumo ne ( k i =. 5) orahigh one ( k i =. 6). Define β asarealization
of the Betadistribution B (2.6,2.6). Weset:
Thesechoicesr esultin about athirdo fo bservationsin eachcategory,a nd
E ( k i)=m ode ( k i)=. 5,a nd σ ( k i)=. 08. The dummies ι i 1 , ι i 2 ,a nd ι i 3 take value1i f
k i =. 4,.5 or.6,respectively,a nd 0otherwise.
FigureA1. Wage densitiesformen and women
(22)












































UNITARY MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY
APPENDIX B
Simulated data
Table B1. Simulation results
Variable Means.d. min. max.
Exogenous variables
w f 77.355.02 .1 425.3
w m 102.37 1.32 .8 440.8
y f 2,2052,711 120,627
y m 2,8503 ,706 15 2,560
y 5,055 5,460 256,310
Choicevariables,no taxation
c f 5,972 4,115 218 29,931
c m 7,758 5,331291 52,567
c 13,730 6,4041 ,863 56,310
h f 46.8 19.70 100
h m 45.8 19.60 89
l f 73.219.72 0120
l m 74.219.63 11 20
Choicevariables,jointt ax.
c f 4,6932 ,8562 18 18,134
c m 6,0013,474281 31,829
c 10,694 3,6651 ,863 34,095
h f 39.619.60 100
h m 38.619.4 089
l f 80.4 19.63 11 20
l m 81.4 19.4 20 120
Choicevariables,ind. tax.
c f 4,977 2,684 218 17,106
c m 6,049 3,132 291 29,784
c 11,026 3,906 1,863 33,527
h f 42.8 19.8 0100
h m 40.719.60 89
l f 77.219.8 20 120
l m 79.319.63 11 20D.BENINGER, F.LAISNEY
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APPENDIX C
Estimation of unitary model
Table C1. Estimation results –n otaxation coefﬁcientv ector
ParameterVariable Coef. s.e. t
llf × ι f 1 23.22 5.72 4.1
llf × ι f 2 15.565.692.7
llf × ι f 3 7.245 .611 .3
llm × ι m 1 14.30 6.58 2.2
llm × ι m 2 5.15 6.53.8
llm × ι m 3 –3.406 .49 –. 5
β c lc –4 9.9210.76 –4 .7
α ff llf × llf –1 7.59 .57–31.0
α mm llm × llm –1 8.04. 61– 29.8
α cc lc × lc 1.51 .423 .6
α fm llf × llm 25.39. 81 31.4
α fc llf × lc 3.45 .44 7.9
α mc llm × lc 5.23 .5210.1
Table C2. Estimation results –j ointt axation coefficientv ector
ParameterVariable Coef. s.e. t
llf × ι f 1 –1 3.424.60 –2.9
llf × ι f 2 –20.804.59 –4 .5
llf × ι f 3 –28.864.50–6.4
llm × ι m 1 4.45 5.26 .8
llm × ι m 2 –4 .18 5.19 –. 8
llm × ι m 3 –1 2.475.13–2.4
β c lc –68.712.45 –28.0
α ff llf × llf –1 9.02 .64– 29.5
α mm llm × llm –20.17.70 –28.8
α cc lc × lc 1.64. 07 25.1
α fm llf × llm 30.80.963 2.1
α fc llf × lc 6.39. 33 19.6
α mc llm × lc 5.95 .37 15.9
ˆ θ o
β ι f f 1
β ι f f 2
β ι f f 3
β ι m m 1
β ι m m 2
β ι m m 3
ˆ θ c
β ι f f 1
β ι f f 2
β ι f f 3
β ι m m 1
β ι m m 2
β ι m m 335
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Table C3. Estimation results –i ndividualtaxation coefficientv ector
ParameterVariable Coef. s.e. t
llf × ι f 1 –1 7.974.79– 3.7
llf × ι f 2 –24.59 4.81 –5 .1
llf × ι f 3 –31.44 4.77 –6.6
llm × ι m 1 –21.06 5.32 –4 .0
llm × ι m 2 –28.935.31– 5.4
llm × ι m 3 –36.505.30 –6.9
β c lc –9 1.343.50–26.1
α ff llf × llf –1 3.80.52–26.6
α mm llm × llm –1 5.01. 58 –25.7
α cc lc × lc 2.35. 0926.5
α fm llf × llm 21.23 .73 29.2
α fc llf × lc 6.22 .44 14.1
α mc llm × lc 8.14 .49 16.6
ˆ θ p
β ι f f 1
β ι f f 2
β ι f f 3
β ι m m 1
β ι m m 2




The first column of table Dshows the amountof taxr evenuei nthe situationsof
jointand individualtaxation,c omputed from the simulated data.The small
discrepancybetween bothf igurescould of coursebee liminated byadjusting,say,the
taxbrackets in the jointt axation situation. Howevert he subsequentcolumnss how
thatt hisisof minorimportance. Foreache stimated parameterv ectorand foreach
fiscalsystem,wereport the taxr evenueassociated withthe predicted labormarket
situation of eachh ousehold. The misspecification associated withthe unitary
representation leadst oi mportantdiscrepancies.Inall casest he unitary model
predicts substantiallylargert axr evenuesforjointt axation,whereast he actualtax
revenuei sactuallymarginallylowert hanf orindividualtaxation. Thispointis
important,b ecausethe evaluation of fiscalreformsoften entailst he specification of
revenuen eutralreforms.
The factt hatt he worst predictionsareo btained using isnots urprising,since
the introduction of taxation leadst ol arge adjustments in labors upplies.Howeverit
iss lightlypuzzling tof ind thatt he revenuef orindividualtaxisbetterpredicted
using than. Nosuchreversalappears forjointt axation. Anotherpuzzle lies
in the factt hatt axr evenuespredicted using and arel argert hanthe actual
taxr evenue,sincethe unitary model leadst oanunder-estimation of labors upplies
(see sixthsection,subsection 2). Inf act, low levelsof labors upplyareratherover-
estimated and notablyt he numberof participants isoverstated. But individualsw ith
lowlabors upplyhaveo naverage higheru nearned income and arethus morel ikely
tobetaxed.




Jointt axation 2,999,920 4,096,1803 ,289,330 3,490,220
Individualtaxation 3,026,5103 ,801,9103 ,121,9903 ,324,170
Variation –. 88% +7.74% +5 .36%+ 5.00%
ˆ θ o
ˆ θ c ˆ θ p
ˆ θ c ˆ θ p
ˆ θ o ˆ θ
c ˆ θ p